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ave Frohnmayer was first elected as Oregon attorney general in 
1980. He was reelected twice, in 1984 and 1988. In 1988, he 
received the nomination of his own Republican Party and, by write-in 
vote, he also captured the Democratic Party’s nomination.1 In 
November 1988, Dave Frohnmayer received 956,767 votes, 88.93%, 
of the votes cast.2 At the time, it was the most votes ever cast for a 
candidate for state office, and is still the highest percentage of votes 
cast for a statewide candidate.3 
Ask a knowledgeable Oregonian about the Frohnmayer years in the 
Oregon Department of Justice (DOJ) and you will likely hear about 
Dave Frohnmayer’s personal record of success in the United States 
Supreme Court: seven oral arguments, six victories. You may also hear 
about Dave Frohnmayer’s national leadership among his fellow 
attorneys general: president of the National Association of Attorneys 
General (NAAG), chair of the Conference of Western Attorneys 
General, recipient of NAAG’s prestigious Wyman award. You might 
also hear about how he was selected by his peers to argue before a 
special United States Court of Appeals panel on behalf of all fifty states 
in a 1985 case involving billions of dollars of oil overcharges in the 
1970s.4 These are impressive landmarks in the career of a singularly 
gifted public servant. But they do not capture the full impact of the man 
on the office that he helped to shape. 
Dave Frohnmayer redefined the role of the Oregon attorney general. 
Whether testifying before the legislature, arguing before an appellate 
court, or issuing legal opinions about the operations of government, his 
prime objective was always to develop and to articulate a consistent, 
principled, and well-reasoned legal policy for the State of Oregon. 
 
1 SEC’Y OF STATE, VOTERS’ PAMPHLET: STATE OF OREGON GENERAL ELECTION 
NOVEMBER 8, 1988 88 (1988), http://library.state.or.us/repository/2010/201003011350161 
/ORVPGenMari1988.pdf. 
2 Dave Leip, 1988 Attorney General Election Results–Oregon, DAVE LIEP’S ATLAS OF 
U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (Jan. 13, 2007), http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state 
.php?fips=41&year=1988&f=0&off=9&elect=0. 
3 John Kroger received 1,096,507 votes in 2008 (72.6% of all votes cast). John Kroger, 
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/John_Kroger (last visited Apr. 26, 2016). 
4 See United States v. Exxon Corp., 773 F.2d 1240 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985). 
D 
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Equally important, he taught, by his own example, that dogged 
devotion to principled law development, rigorous scholarship, and a 
fierce determination to insulate the state’s legal positions from partisan 
political infighting are the keys to successful service as attorney 
general. Even today, the performance of Oregon’s attorney general can 
and should be measured against the standard that Dave Frohnmayer 
established. 
In 1980, I was the deputy solicitor general, responsible for the day-
to-day management of the DOJ’s Appellate Division. At the time, I did 
not know Dave Frohnmayer. But, after his election, it was my good 
fortune to work closely with him at the DOJ for the next nine years. I 
was witness to the events described in this Article that helped shape the 
way that Frohnmayer viewed the role of the attorney general and his 
approach to fulfilling that role. This Article explores the beginnings of 
Frohnmayer’s career as a United States Supreme Court advocate. It is 
offered not as a memoir, but as an examination of the experience that 
colored his approach to law and public policy for the rest of his life. 
I 
THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Every four years, Oregon voters elect the state’s attorney general. 
But the power to choose does not necessarily come with the wisdom to 
understand the responsibilities of the office. For many voters, the 
attorney general is seen as the state’s “Top Cop”—a sort of law 
enforcement czar whose hands control every lever of the state’s 
criminal law enforcement machinery. Others think of the attorney 
general as the people’s lawyer—protecting Oregonians from predatory 
hucksters and charlatans, appearing like a guardian angel whenever and 
wherever injustice may be found. 
In fact, Oregon’s attorney general has less to do with criminal 
prosecutions and consumer protection than most Oregonians imagine. 
The Oregon Constitution vests most of the state’s criminal prosecution 
function in “prosecuting [a]ttorneys,” “elected by districts,” who shall 
be the “law officers of the State.”5 Thus, the district attorneys are 
constitutionally designated as the state’s criminal prosecutors, while 
the office of attorney general is not mentioned anywhere in the Oregon 
 
5 OR. CONST. art. VII, § 17. 
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Constitution.6 The legislature has given the attorney general only 
limited, and in some respects, unclear prosecutorial authority. The 
attorney general is directed to “[a]ppear for the state in the trial of all 
civil and criminal causes in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals 
in which the state may be directly or indirectly interested.”7 The 
attorney general’s responsibility for all criminal appeals is underscored 
by the fact that she may “in any case brought to the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals from their respective counties, demand and 
receive assistance of the district attorney from whose county such case 
or matter is brought.”8 
While the attorney general’s jurisdiction over criminal appeals is 
clear, the attorney general’s role in criminal prosecutions at the trial 
level is murkier. Generally, the attorney general may “take full charge 
of any investigation or prosecution of violation of law in which the 
circuit court has jurisdiction,” but only when “directed to do so by the 
[g]overnor.”9 Without directions from the governor or cooperation 
 
6 See id. In full, section 17 of the Oregon Constitution, the only section that refers to 
criminal prosecution, provides: 
There shall be elected by districts comprised of one, or more counties, a sufficient 
number of prosecuting Attorneys, who shall be the law officers of the State, and 
of the counties within their respective districts, and shall perform such duties 
pertaining to the administration of Law, and general police as the Legislative 
Assembly may direct. 
The original Article VII of the Oregon Constitution dealt with the judicial system. Sec’y of 
State, Transcribed 1857 Oregon Constitution: Article VII, OR. ST. ARCHIVES: CRAFTING 
OR. CONST., http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/pages/exhibits/1857/learn/transcribed/trans6.htm 
(last updated 2009). The entire article was amended by the voters in 1910. Id. The 
amendments did not specifically address the office of district attorney. Id. However, article 
VII, section 2 (as amended) provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he courts, jurisdiction, and 
judicial system of Oregon, except so far as expressly changed by this amendment, shall 
remain as at present constituted until otherwise provided by law.” Sec’y of State, 
Constitution of Oregon: 2015 Version, OR. BLUE BOOK, http://bluebook.state.or.us/state 
/constitution/constitution07a.htm (last updated 2016). Thus, although the office of district 
attorney was created by the constitution, the legislature has the power to define the 
responsibilities of the office or to eliminate it all together. 
7 OR. REV. STAT. § 180.060(1)(a) (2015). 
8 Id. § 180.060(5). 
9 Id. § 180.070(1). Despite the unambiguous provision that the attorney general can take 
“full charge” of a criminal investigation or prosecution only when directed to do so by the 
governor, Oregon Revised Statutes sections 180.070(1) and 180.240 provide that the 
attorney general and the DOJ “shall have the same powers and prerogatives in each of the 
several counties of the state as the district attorneys have in their respective counties.” 
Further adding to ambiguity as to the respective roles of the attorney general and district 
attorneys, section 180.060(5) directs the attorney general to “consult with, advise and direct 
the district attorneys in all criminal causes.” (emphasis added). For decades, this ambiguity 
has lay dormant beneath a well-established, bipartisan tradition of cooperation between the 
DOJ and the state’s thirty-six elected district attorneys. 
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from a district attorney, the attorney general’s only direct criminal 
jurisdiction outside of the appellate courts relates to organized crime 
and public corruption.10 There, however, the attorney general’s 
authority is limited to providing “administrative, clerical, investigative 
and legal assistance;”11 serving as a “liaison” between local, state, and 
federal law enforcement agencies;12 investigating allegations of public 
corruption; and “coordinat[ing], cooperat[ing,] and assist[ing] in taking 
legal action.”13 
The attorney general’s role in protecting Oregon consumers is 
bolstered by fairly broad enforcement authority, but it is constrained by 
a chronic and sustained scarcity of resources to implement that 
authority. For example, the attorney general (together with the state’s 
thirty-six district attorneys) is charged with broad enforcement powers 
under the Unlawful Trade Practices Act.14 Similarly, the legislature has 
codified the attorney general’s common law authority to oversee the 
operation of charitable trusts.15 In both of these arenas, the legislature 
does not appropriate the resources to carry out these functions. Instead, 
the attorney general is given what is, in effect, a hunting license to raise 
the funds to support his or her activities in these areas. Thus, for 
example, funds received by the DOJ “under a judgment, settlement, 
compromise or assurance of voluntary compliance” are deposited in 
the Department of Justice Protection and Education Revolving 
Account and are continuously appropriated to the DOJ for use in 
connection with unlawful trade practices and antitrust litigation.16 And 
the DOJ is authorized to charge fees for charitable organizations to file 
reports that are required by the Charitable Trust and Corporation Act.17 
Those fees are to be “sufficient to pay the department’s expenses in 
administering” the Act.18 
 
10 See id. §§ 180.610–.640 (outlining the DOJ’s power to investigate organized crime); 
Id. § 180.210 (identifying the attorney general is the head of the DOJ and “the chief law 
officer for the state and all its departments”). 
11 Id. § 180.610(1). 
12 Id. § 180.610(3). 
13 Id. § 180.610(5). 
14 Id. § 646.605–.652. See, e.g., id. § 646.618 (attorney general may issue civil 
investigative demand); id. § 646.632 (attorney general may enter into assurances of 
voluntary compliance and sue to enjoin unlawful trade practices). 
15 See, e.g., id. § 128.710 (attorney general may sue to enforce statutes regulating 
charitable trusts). 
16 Id. § 180.095(3). 
17 Id. § 128.670. 
18 Id. § 128.670(7)(e). 
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Contrary to public perception, the primary function of the attorney 
general and the DOJ is to provide legal advice and representation to 
Oregon state government. The attorney general is charged to perform, 
upon request, “all legal services for the state or any department or 
officer of the state.”19 The attorney general is designated as the head of 
the DOJ and “the chief law officer for the state and all of its 
departments.”20 The DOJ is given “[g]eneral control and supervision 
of all civil actions and legal proceedings in which the State of Oregon 
may be a party or may be interested.”21 It has “[f]ull charge and control 
of all of the legal business of all departments, commissions and bureaus 
of the state, or of any office thereof, which requires the services of an 
attorney or counsel in order to protect the interests of the state.”22 
The legislature left no doubt that the DOJ, under the leadership and 
direction of the attorney general, has full power to determine, 
articulate, and control the state’s legal affairs. Not only is the DOJ 
authorized to advise and represent the state; it is given the exclusive 
power to do so. Oregon Revised Statutes section 180.220(2) provides 
that “[n]o state officer, board, commission or the head of a department 
or institution of the state shall employ or be represented by any other 
counsel or attorney at law.”23 
The resulting monopoly of the power to determine the state’s legal 
position is the most fundamental distinction between the role of the 
attorney general in developing state legal policy and the role of 
virtually any other attorney in representing a client. Clients generally 
retain the ultimate control of the legal positions that counsel advance 
on their behalf. Legal counsel advises the client. The client remains 
free to accept or reject the attorney’s advice. If the client is dissatisfied 
with the attorney’s advice, the client can select new counsel. This is not 
so within Oregon’s state government. The attorney general and his or 
her assistants are the only attorneys who may develop and articulate 
the state’s legal policy. And regardless of which state official or 
department may require representation, the DOJ’s responsibility is 
 
19 Id. § 180.060(6). 
20 Id. § 180.210. 
21 Id. § 180.220(1)(a). 
22 Id. § 180.220(1)(b). 
23 Even when it is “inappropriate and contrary to the public interest for the office of the 
[a]ttorney [g]eneral to concurrently represent more than one public officer or agency in a 
particular matter or class of matters in circumstances which would create or tend to create a 
conflict of interest on the part of the [a]ttorney [g]eneral,” state officers or agencies may 
engage counsel other than the attorney general only with the attorney general’s permission. 
Id. § 180.235(1). 
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always “to protect the interests of the state,”24 not the narrow interests 
of the department or official who brought the legal issue to the DOJ. 
The legislative delegation of power to the attorney general and the DOJ 
effectively establishes a bifurcation of responsibility between the 
attorney general, on one hand, and the state agency or official that the 
attorney general represents, on the other. The client agency or official 
is responsible for implementing (and in some cases determining) the 
public policy entrusted to it; the attorney general is responsible for 
determining and implementing the state’s legal policy. 
Nor does the attorney general’s power to determine and implement 
the state’s legal policy operate under the financial limitations that 
constrain the attorney general’s narrower law enforcement powers. 
Rather than depend upon a general fund appropriation to cover the cost 
of representing state agencies and officers, the attorney general is 
authorized to “charge such officers, agencies and public bodies . . . for 
the cost of such assistance.”25 Accordingly, the attorney general’s 
power to establish and defend the state’s legal policy is unfettered by 
controlling clients and unconstrained by limited financial resources. 
Frohnmayer saw the Oregon attorney general’s power to control the 
state’s legal policy as a powerful tool for protecting citizens from 
government overreach. No individual could reasonably expect that the 
state’s legal positions would always be to his or her liking, but all 
citizens have a right to expect that the law will be interpreted and 
applied consistently across all government departments. The state’s 
position should not depend on whether it is being articulated on behalf 
of the Department of Energy or the secretary of state. Similarly, all 
citizens should be able to count on the fact that the state’s legal position 
was based on sound legal principles, not on the imperatives of the 
moment. Frohnmayer often counseled government lawyers to resist the 
temptation to resort to what he called “ad hoc advocacy”—the impulse 
to advance arguments that might win the case but that would not stand 
the test of time. Finally, Frohnmayer was uncompromising in his 
insistence that the state’s legal arguments be well reasoned. He wanted 
the DOJ to be the finest public law firm in America because he believed 
that Oregonians had a right to expect nothing less. He demanded that 
DOJ lawyers approach the formulation of the state’s legal policy with 
uncompromising intellectual rigor. 
 
24 Id. § 180.220(1)(b). 
25 Id. § 180.160. 
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As a professor of administrative and constitutional law, Frohnmayer 
studied the evolution of the role of the United States Attorney General 
from colonial days to the present. “[T]he Judiciary Act of 1789—the 
first bill introduced in the first Senate of the United States—created the 
office of attorney general but gave him no role in . . . representation of 
the government in civil trials.”26 Frohnmayer was aware of criticism 
leveled at the absence of centralized control of legal policy at the 
federal level and he believed that such centralized control was essential 
to good government at the state level. Former U.S. Attorney General 
Griffin Bell described the need for such control as a structural 
imperative: 
 While recognizing that Congress intended some regulatory 
agencies to be independent of the executive branch and the President, 
I do not think this independence should extend to legal matters. The 
price is too high. It can and sometimes does result in two sets of 
government lawyers opposing each other at taxpayer expense. And it 
often permits interagency disputes to be carried to the judicial branch 
instead of being resolved through the Department of Justice, which 
could handle them more efficiently. These disputes are questions of 
government policy, which our country’s Founding Fathers did not 
envision judges deciding. The independence of the regulatory 
agencies could still be preserved if the Justice Department 
represented them on legal matters. The department would merely be 
bringing uniformity to government legal positions, and it would still 
recognize the independence of the regulatory agencies’ enforcement 
efforts.27 
Like Griffin Bell, Frohnmayer considered the U.S. Solicitor General 
to be a better role model for Oregon’s Attorney General than the U.S. 
Attorney General.28 As a distinguished former solicitor general had 
observed, sometimes proper attention to government legal policy 
requires the ability to say no: 
His is the task of resisting their tearful importunities to seek review 
of cases they have lost. The loss seems to them calamitous. Their 
preoccupation is with the immediate result, or at least their purview 
is likely limited to their particular work. The solicitor general must 
seek a broad perspective of the total law business of the United 
States, not merely a program of any single agency. 
 
26 GRIFFIN B. BELL & RONALD J. OSTROW, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW 174 (1982). 
27 Id. at 177. 
28 Id. at 178 (“Th[e] office [of the solicitor general] is a role model for the kind of 
governmentwide law office that I am advocating.”). 
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 A principal task of the solicitor general is to determine when not 
to press for a victory in court, for sometimes a victory may prove 
more disastrous than a defeat.29 
Midway through his first term as attorney general, Frohnmayer’s 
power to say no to his government clients was challenged. In a move  
meant to balance the budget, the legislature directed the transfer of $81 
million from the Industrial Accident Fund to the state’s general fund.30 
SAIF Corporation, the state-owned workers compensation insurance 
company, retained private counsel to challenge the transfer in court. 
Frohnmayer sued to block the unauthorized lawsuit, and the Oregon 
Supreme Court concluded that the attorney general had the exclusive 
power to represent the state, including SAIF Corporation, and that 
private counsel lacked the authority to sue on behalf of the state without 
the attorney general’s consent.31 
II 
THE 1980 CAMPAIGN, PRISON OVERCROWDING, AND CAPPS V. 
ATIYEH 
A. The “Top Cop” versus the “Chief Law Officer” 
When Dave Frohnmayer first ran for attorney general in 1980, he 
was impressively qualified to assume the attorney general’s statutory 
role as “the chief law officer of the state and all [of] its departments.”32 
A magna cum laude graduate of Harvard, a Rhodes Scholar, and a 
graduate of the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, he 
had served as an official in the Nixon administration and practiced at 
one of San Francisco’s most distinguished law firms. He returned to 
Oregon to teach constitutional law and administrative law at the 
University of Oregon.33 While teaching, he also served as legal counsel 
to the president of the university and was elected three times to the 
Oregon legislature as a Republican in the heavily Democratic south 
 
29 Simon E. Sobeloff, The Law Business of the United States, 34 OR. L. REV. 145, 151 
(1955); see also STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 42–44 
(Lynne M. Ross ed., 1990) (collecting authorities for The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.). 
30 Frohnmayer v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 660 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Or. 1983). 
31 Id. at 1063, 1071. 
32 OR. REV. STAT. § 180.210 (2015). 
33 Curriculum Vitae, Dave Frohnmayer, President Emeritus and Professor of Law, 
University of Oregon, http://frohnmayer.uoregon.edu/sites/default/files/frohnmayer/docu 
ments/resume.pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 2016). 
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Eugene district.34 As one admittedly biased supporter—Frohnmayer’s 
wife Lynn—said, “[h]e is qualified to be the legal conscience of the 
state.”35 
His Democratic opponent, Multnomah County District Attorney 
Harl Haas, presented a formidable counterpoint to Frohnmayer’s 
impressive resume. The chief prosecutor in Oregon’s most populace 
county, Haas came to the race with a national reputation as a tough and 
innovative crime fighter.36 Like Frohnmayer, Haas was a former state 
legislator, but as a Portland Democrat in a heavily Democratic state, he 
began the race with a decided edge. The Haas campaign touted his 
prosecution experience and tried to portray Frohnmayer as an academic 
elitist, suggesting that his lack of prosecution experience rendered him 
unqualified to be attorney general.37 Haas frequently referred to 
Frohnmayer as “the professor.”38 He said that Frohnmayer “spent his 
time in the public sector, political arena of the Legislature, rather than 
acquiring the professional background in the practice of law.”39 
While the Haas campaign emphasized that he would be “tougher on 
crime than Frohnmayer,” Frohnmayer responded that, “the attorney 
general is not the ‘super cop’ of Oregon.”40 But Frohnmayer also 
touted his own law enforcement credentials, including endorsements 
from “Oregon’s police chiefs, rank and file police officers and 21 
 
34 Id. 
35 Henny Willis, Speaker Highly Complimentary to Frohnmayer; She’s His Wife, 
EUGENE REG.-GUARD, Oct. 3, 1980, at 9B. 
36 SEC’Y OF STATE, VOTERS’ PAMPHLET: STATE OF OREGON GENERAL ELECTION 
NOVEMBER 4, 1980 71 (1980). In his general election voters’ pamphlet statement, Harl Haas 
touted his service as Vice President and Treasurer of the National District Attorneys 
Association, flattering stories about him in Reader’s Digest and on 60 Minutes, and his 
initiative in spearheading creation of a statewide Crime Victim’s Compensation Act, a “no 
plea bargaining” policy, and creation of Oregon’s first Rape Victims’ Assistance program. 
Id. 
37 Id. Haas claimed that he was “the only candidate with qualified experience in the major 
areas of responsibility of the attorney general’s office: Consumer Protection, Criminal 
Justice, Support Enforcement, Trial Division, Appellate Division.” Id. His voters’ pamphlet 
statement did not mention the attorney general’s responsibility for advising state agencies 
or officers or articulating the state’s legal policy. 
38 See Henny Willis, Haas, Frohnmayer Even, EUGENE REG.-GUARD, Oct. 29, 1980, at 
B1 (Haas dismissed “Frohnmayer publicly as ‘the professor’ without real trial experience”). 
39 Joseph R. Sand, Attorney General Race Rated Too Close to Predict, BULLETIN, Oct. 
23, 1980, at 10 (quoting Haas). 
40 Frohnmayer, Haas Trade Barbs Again, EUGENE REG.-GUARD, Oct. 25, 1980, at 7A. 
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former Haas employees.”41 A week before the November 1980 vote, 
polls showed the race to be a dead heat.42 
B. Prison Overcrowding and Capps v. Atiyeh 
On June 27, 1980, in a class action lawsuit brought on behalf of 
Oregon prisoners, the Honorable James M. Burns, Chief Judge of the 
United States District Court for the District of Oregon, ruled that 
overcrowded conditions in Oregon’s prisons violated the prohibition of 
cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.43 Over the course of the summer, the court held 
hearings to determine the appropriate form of injunctive relief. On 
August 22, 1980, as the candidates were gearing up for the fall 
campaign, Chief Judge Burns dropped a bomb. He ordered that the 
State of Oregon reduce its prison population by at least 500 inmates by 
December 31, 1980, and by 750 inmates by March 31, 1981.44 The 
federal court’s injunction instantly became an issue in the campaign for 
attorney general. Frohnmayer vowed that, if he were elected, he would 
appeal and reverse Chief Judge Burns’s order.45 For his part, Haas 
continued to call for the construction of more prisons.46 The impact, if 
any, that the Capps order had on the race for attorney general cannot 
be determined. When the votes were counted, Dave Frohnmayer had 
been elected with sixty-three percent of the vote.47 But the newly 
elected attorney general confronted the imminent release of 750 
 
41 Id. 
42 See Sand, supra note 39, at 10 (Haas and Frohnmayer tied at thirty-seven percent each, 
with twenty-one percent undecided). 
43 Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 803–04 (D. Or. 1980). 
44 Id. at 806. Thirty-five years after Chief Judge Burns’s order, the number of prisoners 
to be released may not seem shocking. In December 2015, the State of Oregon held 
approximately 14,677 inmates in prison custody. OR. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 
INMATE POPULATION PROFILE FOR 12/1/2015 (2015) [hereinafter INMATE PROFILE]. In 
1980, the three correctional institutions covered by Judge Burns’s order, the Oregon State 
Prison, the Oregon State Correctional Facility, and the Farm Annex, combined held 
approximately 2,455 inmates—12,000 fewer inmates than today. Compare Capps, 495 F. 
Supp. at 809, with INMATE PROFILE, supra. Chief Judge Burns’s order required that the 
inmate populations in those facilities to be reduced by more than thirty percent. 
45 David Whitney, Personal Issues Dominate Race for Attorney General, OREGONIAN, 
Oct. 30, 1980, at C6. 
46 Willis, supra note 38, at B1. 
47 David Whitney, Frohnmayer Plans to Take Policy Role, OREGONIAN, Nov. 6, 1980, 
at B4 (Haas received 31.9% of the vote and a third party candidate received 4.8%). 
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convicted felons and the challenge of fulfilling his campaign promise 
to reverse the case on appeal. 
On its face, the Capps injunction seemed well-founded. The three 
institutions in question had a combined design capacity of 1,708 
inmates, but, at the time, they were housing more than 2,500 inmates.48 
This larger population was accommodated by housing two inmates in 
one-person cells, and by reducing the amount of dormitory space 
allowed for each prisoner.49 As a consequence, the space accorded each 
inmate in these facilities fell far below the recommendations contained 
in the professional standards of the American Correctional Association, 
the American Public Health Association, the National Sheriff’s 
Association, federal corrections officials, and even the United States 
Army, which, as Chief Judge Burns noted, was “never known for 
‘coddling.’”50 Chief Judge Burns found that the effects of this 
overcrowding were substantial and wide-ranging: 
Overcrowding at OSP, the Annex, and OSCI far exceeds the level of 
applicable professional standards; has increased the health risks to 
which inmates are exposed; has impinged on the proper delivery of 
medical and mental health care; has reduced the opportunity for 
inmates to participate in rehabilitative programs; has resulted in 
idleness; has produced an atmosphere of tension and fear among 
inmates and staff; has reduced the ability of the institutions to protect 
inmates from assaults; and is likely to produce embittered citizens 
with heightened antisocial attitudes and behavior.51 
In the decade before Capps, federal courts, with increasing 
frequency, had invoked the Eighth Amendment’s protections to 
address inadequate and, in some cases, deplorable prison conditions.52 
As in Capps, these courts invoked well-worn but amorphous standards 
such as “evolving standards of decency,” “shocking to the conscience,” 
 
48 Capps, 495 F. Supp. at 809. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 809–10. 
51 Id. at 812–13. 
52 See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102–03 (1976); Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. 
Supp. 122, 153 (D. Colo. 1979); Stewart v. Rhodes, 473 F. Supp. 1185, 1193 (S.D. Ohio 
1979), aff’d, 785 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1986); Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1021 
(S.D. Ohio 1977), aff’d, 624 F. 2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1980), rev’d, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); 
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 979 (D. R.I. 1977); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 
318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff’d in part and modified in part sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 
559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 
U.S. 781 (1978); Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 422 (E.D. Okla. 1974), aff’d, 564 
F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 898 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff’d, 
501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 372–73 (E.D. Ark. 1970), 
aff’d, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). 
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and “totality of circumstances” to find a jurisdictional basis in the 
Eighth Amendment for federal courts to impose architectural and 
penological standards on the states. By the time Capps was decided, 
prison conditions in at least twenty-nine states had been found to 
violate the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.53 All 
indications were that Capps was a part of an overwhelming legal trend 
and was supported by the overwhelming weight of authority. 
Yet there was reason to question the constitutional pedigree of the 
growing federal law of prison overcrowding. The Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. The United 
States Supreme Court had recognized that deliberate indifference to an 
inmate’s medical needs is cruel and unusual because, in the worst case, 
it can result in physical torture, and, even in less serious cases, it can 
result in pain without any penological purpose.54 Similarly, the Court 
had held that a punishment violates the Eighth Amendment if it is 
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.55 But the Court 
had never held that a state’s entire prison system violated the Eighth 
Amendment because it failed to provide the amount of physical space 
per prisoner that professional standards recommend. One could fairly 
question how it could be that prisons in more than half of the states 
could be deemed to be both cruel and unusual. And it was reasonable 
to wonder how a state could hope to overturn a prison overcrowding 
order on appeal when the decision rested entirely on the subjective 
conclusions of a single federal judge. Even before he took office, 
Attorney General-elect Frohnmayer faced that formidable challenge: 
500 convicted felons were due to be released pursuant to a federal court 
injunction that he had vowed to overturn. 
  
 
53 See generally Francine Sherman Tucker, The Charles Street Jail Litigation: The 
Allowable Extent of Federal Judicial Involvement, 7 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 665 (1979) 
(discussing Eighth Amendment violations); Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause—
Prison Conditions: Wilson v. Seiter, 105 HARV. L. REV. 235 (1991) (discussing prison 
conditions). 
54 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. 
55 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
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III 
RHODES V. CHAPMAN, THE CIRCUIT JUSTICE, AND FRIENDS OF THE 
COURT 
A. Rhodes v. Chapman 
In concluding that Oregon prison conditions were unconstitutional, 
Chief Judge Burns relied in part on Chapman v. Rhodes, a decision 
from a federal district court from the Southern District of Ohio.56 
There, the district court held that conditions at the Southern Ohio 
Correctional Facility were unconstitutional because the prison housed 
two prisoners each in sixty-three square foot cells that were designed 
to accommodate only one.57 The court arrived at this conclusion even 
though the court described the prison as “unquestionably a top-flight, 
first-class facility.”58 And despite findings that the food was “adequate 
in every respect;”59 air ventilation and heating and cooling were well 
controlled; there were adequate dayrooms, visitation facilities, 
libraries, and schoolrooms; and there was no evidence of indifference 
to the medical needs of prisoners,60 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower 
court’s decision.61 The Ohio attorney general asked the United States 
Supreme Court to hear the case. Shortly after Chief Judge Burns issued 
his injunction in Capps, the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Rhodes v. Chapman to decide whether the housing of two 
inmates in a single cell constituted cruel and unusual punishment.62 
The Supreme Court’s looming decision in Rhodes cast a long 
shadow on Eighth Amendment law. For Attorney General-elect 
Frohnmayer and appellate lawyers assigned to the Capps appeal, the 
grant of certiorari called for an entirely new appellate strategy. The 
timing of the Ohio case was fortuitous. The United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Rhodes would be issued before the Ninth Circuit 
heard Capps. Although the issues in the two cases were not identical, 
it was clear that what the Supreme Court decided would have a direct 
and probably a dispositive effect on what the Ninth Circuit decided in 
Capps. 
 
56 434 F. Supp. 1007. 
57 Id. at 1021. 
58 Id. at 1009. 
59 Id. at 1014. 
60 Id. at 1009–16. 
61 Rhodes v. Chapman, 624 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1980). 
62 449 U.S. 951 (1980) (granting cert). 
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It was not a significant overstatement to say that if Ohio won, 
Oregon would win; and if Ohio lost, Oregon could not win. Dave 
Frohnmayer had his first case in the United States Supreme Court 
before he had even taken the oath of office as Oregon’s attorney 
general. The only problem was that it was not his case. He could not 
control the arguments that Ohio made. He could not make Oregon’s 
case before the Court. Dave Frohnmayer had made it to the Supreme 
Court, but only as a passenger. 
B. The Circuit Justice 
Before the appeal team in Capps could focus its attention on helping 
Ohio win Rhodes v. Chapman, it had to deal with a more urgent 
problem. Chief Judge Burns had entered an injunction requiring 
Oregon to reduce its prison population by 750 inmates, and Oregon was 
required to release 500 by December 31, 1980.63 Unless the 
enforcement of the injunction was stayed, the harm threatened by the 
injunction would largely be done before Dave Frohnmayer became 
attorney general. 
The State’s motion for a stay was summarily rejected by the district 
court.64 The Ninth Circuit did the same.65 The DOJ was down to its 
last strike. Its final recourse was to ask the United States Supreme 
Court Justice assigned oversight responsibility for the Ninth Circuit, to 
enter a stay pending appeal. It was a long shot at best. The Supreme 
Court’s rules seemed to permit such “in-chambers” motions and 
commentators recognized the practice.66 But the DOJ could not find a 
single instance other than death penalty cases, where even one Justice 
had granted a stay in a case that was not pending in the Supreme Court 
at the time. 
Justice William Rehnquist had recently been assigned to act as 
Circuit Justice for the Ninth Circuit. The DOJ filed its Emergency 
Application for Stay with Circuit Justice Rehnquist’s chambers. A few 
days later, the clerk of the United States Supreme Court notified the 
DOJ by telephone that Justice Rehnquist had entered an order granting 
a temporary stay pending a response to the State’s motion from the 
 
63 Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp 802, 806 (D. Or. 1980). 
64 See Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. 1312, 1313 (1981). 
65 See id. 
66 See U.S. SUP. CT. R. 43–44 (1980) (currently governed under U.S. SUP. CT. R. 22.3); 
ROBERT L. STERN & EUGENE GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 846–58, 867–80 (5th 
ed. 1978). 
GARY (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2016  8:04 AM 
604 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94, 589 
plaintiffs. Two months later, after briefing, Justice Rehnquist entered 
an in-chambers opinion and order granting a stay of the injunction 
“pending the decision of this Court in Rhodes v. Chapman . . . or the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit . . . (whichever 
may come first).”67 Justice Rehnquist first noted that “although it 
should not be nearly as frequently done as in the case of a final 
judgment of the court of appeals, an application to a Circuit Justice of 
this court from a district court is within the contemplation of the All 
Writs Act.”68 He then noted that, unlike the pretrial detainees involved 
in an earlier Supreme Court decision,69 the “respondents here . . . ha[d] 
been tried, found guilty, and sentenced to a term” in prison.70 He found 
this to be a critical distinction: 
[T]he legislature has spoken through its penal statutes and its 
conferring of authority on the parole authorities to seriously penalize 
those duly convicted of crimes which it has defined as such. In short, 
nobody promised them a rose garden; and I know of nothing in the 
Eighth Amendment which requires that they be housed in a manner 
most pleasing to them, or considered even by most knowledgeable 
penal authorities to be likely to avoid confrontations, psychological 
depression, and the like.71 
Noting that the Oregon district court had relied upon Rhodes when 
it was “simply a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,” 
Justice Rehnquist concluded that it would be “best” that the district 
court “have the benefit of this Court’s opinion in that case before it 
takes over management of the Oregon prison system.”72 
C. Friends of the Court 
While Attorney General-elect Frohnmayer selected his key aides 
and planned his initial moves as attorney general in the late fall of 1980, 
he also worked with the Capps appeal team on the amicus curiae brief 
that Oregon would file in Rhodes.73 The goal was simple: advocate a 
rule of law in Rhodes that would require a reversal in Capps. 
 
67 Atiyeh, 449 U.S. at 1313. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 1315 (referencing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 1315–16. 
72 Id. at 1316. 
73 Brief of the State of Alaska et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Rhodes v. 
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (No. 80-332), 1980 WL 339866. Oregon’s amicus brief was 
filed on December 18, 1980, two weeks before Dave Frohnmayer was sworn in as attorney 
general. The Capps appellate team of William F. Gary, James E. Mountain, Jr., and Jan 
GARY (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2016  8:04 AM 
2016] The Frohnmayer Method: Advocacy, Legal Policy, 605 
and the United States Supreme Court 
The Oregon amicus brief argued that lower court prison conditions 
decisions had wandered far afield from the historical and policy 
underpinnings of the Eighth Amendment. It criticized the “totality of 
circumstances” analysis as hopelessly subjective: 
An analysis of the totality, including subjective impressions which 
cannot be recorded, makes it possible for the whole to be greater than 
the sum of its parts. Additionally, the application of the standard 
avoids meaningful analytic or factual review. The more general the 
statement of the conclusion, the more arduous the tasks of appellate 
review become.74 
It advocated that the Court adopt a standard in its stead that was 
faithful to the language and history of the constitutional prohibition of 
“cruel and unusual punishment”: 
The fairest reading of the language of the Amendment would 
interpret it to prohibit the unnecessary infliction of severe pain. Such 
a reading is roughly consonant with the intentions of the framers and 
does not distort the commonly understood meaning of the term “cruel 
and unusual punishment.” 
 . . . 
 . . . A minimum requirement for scrutiny under the Eighth 
Amendment is that the pain inflicted be the kind which hurts in a 
sharp or acute way. The Eighth Amendment was not intended to and 
does not prevent mild physical sufferings which may in some sense 
be “unnecessary.”75 
To bolster the impact of its amicus brief, Oregon enlisted the support 
of other states. In the end, the Oregon amicus brief was filed on behalf 
of thirty states and the territory of the United States Virgin Islands. 
Oregon’s proposed test—that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the 
wanton infliction of pain—struck a chord with the Supreme Court. The 
Court’s 8–1 decision reversed the Sixth Circuit and held that the 
conditions of confinement at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility 
were not cruel and unusual.76 It reached this conclusion echoing the 
standard that the Oregon amicus had urged: “[c]onditions must not 
involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they be 
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.”77 
 
Peter Londahl appeared on the brief along with Attorney General James M. Brown. Id. Dave 
Frohnmayer’s name did not appear on the brief, but he participated meaningfully in shaping 
the argument. 
74 Id. at 21–22. 
75 Id. at 15–16. 
76 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 352. 
77 Id. at 347. 
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Once the United States Supreme Court had clarified the meaning of 
the Eighth Amendment, the result in the Capps appeal was a foregone 
conclusion. The Ninth Circuit summarily vacated the district court’s 
judgment78 and, in 1982, Chief Judge Burns reconsidered his prior 
decision. Guided by the Supreme Court’s decision in Rhodes, he 
rejected nearly all of the prisoner’s claims.79 
IV 
“WHY THE STATES NEED BETTER LAWYERS” 
Rhodes demonstrated, at the outset of Attorney General 
Frohnmayer’s tenure, that Oregon could play a meaningful role in 
establishing legal policy at a national level. Equally important, it 
established that influencing law developed by the United States 
Supreme Court could be an effective strategy to advance Oregon’s 
legal interests at home. But Frohnmayer found a deeper lesson in his 
first foray into the Supreme Court. Oregon’s successful strategy in 
Rhodes and Capps was not exclusively the product of good legal work. 
It also depended in significant part on blind luck. 
In 1981, before the Internet made every action by the Supreme Court 
common knowledge, the Capps appellate team had stumbled upon 
Rhodes by accident. If the Ninth Circuit had not denied the State’s 
requested stay in Capps, if Circuit Justice Rehnquist had not decided 
to intervene, Oregon may never have led the amicus effort by thirty 
states. Frohnmayer realized that if Oregon’s attorney general was going 
to be an effective advocate in the United States Supreme Court, he 
would need help. Oregon needed to stay better informed about the work 
of the Supreme Court. 
Frohnmayer also took a more unsettling lesson from the Rhodes 
experience. The Ohio assistant attorney general who argued the case, 
like most attorneys advocating for the states before the Supreme Court, 
was making his first appearance before the Court. Allen P. Adler was 
an experienced lawyer, but had little appellate experience.80 On the day 
before his Monday argument, Frohnmayer found Adler alone in his 
hotel room, reviewing the briefs. Frohnmayer worried that Adler had 
not done enough to prepare himself for the thirty minutes he had been 
 
78 Capps v. Atiyeh, 652 F.2d 823, 823 (9th Cir. 1981). 
79 Capps v. Atiyeh, 559 F. Supp. 894, 898 (D. Or. 1982). 
80 See Allen P. Adler, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/advocates/allen_p_adler (last visited 
Apr. 27, 2016) (showing that Rhodes is the only case Allen P. Adler has argued before the 
United States Supreme Court). 
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allotted to make his case. When Frohnmayer returned to his hotel to 
nervously await an argument over which he had no control, he came 
upon an op-ed piece in the March 1, 1981, Washington Post. The 
article, written by a young Washington lawyer named Stewart A. 
Baker, carried a headline that seemed to shout out Frohnmayer’s 
nagging concern: “Why the States Need Better Lawyers.”81 
Baker argued that, “of all the institutional litigants appearing 
regularly before the Supreme Court, state and local governmentes [sic] 
consistently present the weakest legal defenses.”82 He posited that 
“underpaid and overburdened” government lawyers “have little leisure 
to follow trends in the Supreme Court’s cases or shifts in the views of 
individual justices.”83 But he emphasized the issue of greatest concern 
to Frohnmayer: 
Perhaps most importantly, state and local government lawyers seem 
to lack the sense of strategy and continuity that is the hallmark of the 
best legal defense groups. The measure of a successful institutional 
advocate is not simply how many cases he wins or loses. Only rarely 
can even the best lawyers turn a losing case into a winner. The test is 
how he wins or loses. When the case has bad facts, a skillful 
institutional advocate manages to lose the case on the facts; when it 
has good facts, he manages to win on a broad principle.84 
Baker advocated that states consider “pooling their resources to 
create a small specialized office” modeled after the office of the United 
States Solicitor General.85 When Frohnmayer returned to Oregon 
following the Rhodes v. Chapman oral argument, he placed a telephone 
call to Stewart Baker. 
A. The NAAG Supreme Court Program 
In December 1981, the National Association of Attorneys General 
(NAAG) held its fall meeting in New Orleans, Louisiana. Stewart 
Baker and Dave Frohnmayer met at the Royal Sonesta Hotel to discuss 
ways to improve the quality of states’ advocacy before the United 
States Supreme Court. 
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Baker’s goal was to create a center for Supreme Court advocacy for 
state and local governments.86 He imagined a small cadre of lawyers 
“providing legal advice, filing amicus briefs, and presenting oral 
argument on behalf of state and local governments involved in 
Supreme Court cases.”87 But Frohnmayer recognized a major obstacle 
to achieving that goal. Attorneys general, like most elected government 
officials, are notoriously protective of their power and authority. In the 
months following Baker’s article in the Washington Post, attorneys 
general had recognized collectively that states’ performance as 
Supreme Court litigators could be improved. But no attorney general 
was prepared to turn over responsibility for his or her United States 
Supreme Court cases to a cadre of Washington D.C. lawyers. To do so 
would require a level of humility not usually found in politicians and 
would likely be seen as weak and ineffective. Frohnmayer had a less 
grandiose vision than Baker’s dream of a solicitor general’s office for 
the states. 
To Frohnmayer, the goal was to help attorneys general improve the 
quality of their offices’ advocacy before the Court, not to subcontract 
out the work. He saw NAAG as the logical organization to fulfill that 
role, not by taking direct responsibility for any cases, but by providing 
advice, training, and assistance so that attorneys general could better 
represent their states’ interests themselves. 
Frohnmayer lobbied and cajoled his fellow attorneys general. He 
worked with the small NAAG staff, based in Washington, D.C., to find 
resources to support a Supreme Court program within NAAG. 
Serendipity once more provided an assist. 
At the time, Lynne Ross was the deputy director of NAAG.88 She 
was married to Douglas Ross, an antitrust attorney in the U.S. 
Department of Justice. In the early years of the Reagan administration, 
government antitrust lawyers found themselves with free time.89 
NAAG entered into an agreement with the U.S. Justice Department for 
Douglas Ross to be temporarily assigned to NAAG to work on its 




88 See Joseph I. Lieberman, Tribute to Lynne M. Ross, CAPITOLWORDS (Oct. 2, 2007), 
http://capitolwords.org/date/2007/10/02/S12431-4_tribute-to-lynne-m-ross/. 
89 See generally Reagan Reportedly to Seek Major Overhaul to Ease Antitrust Laws, L.A. 
TIMES (Jan. 15, 1986), http://articles.latimes.com/1986-01-15/business/fi-28375_1 _anti 
trust-laws (discussing Reagan’s proposed legislation that would ease antitrust laws). 
90 See Paul Marcotte, Dress Rehearsal, 72 A.B.A. J. 17, 26 (1976). 
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NAAG’s first “Supreme Court Counsel.” His “temporary” assignment 
lasted nine years.91 
In the beginning, NAAG’s Supreme Court Counsel fulfilled the 
critical role of acting as the eyes and ears of attorneys general in 
following the activities of the Supreme Court.92 He tracked certiorari 
petitions, monitored the court’s weekly order list and argument 
calendar, and served as a liaison between state attorneys general and 
the clerk of the court. In short order, he also began to coordinate efforts 
by the states to present a united front in amicus briefs on matters of 
particular concern to them. Most significantly, however, NAAG’s 
Supreme Court counsel took responsibility for educating state lawyers 
about all that is involved in handling a case in the Supreme Court. In 
particular, Ross worked diligently to improve state lawyers’ 
preparation for oral argument. He encouraged advocates to conduct at 
least one moot court before presenting their argument. He solicited 
experienced Supreme Court litigators, from both private practice and 
the U.S. Solicitor General’s office, to volunteer their time serving as 
moot court judges. And he organized seminars and meetings on 
Supreme Court practice. 
Douglas Ross and his work as NAAG’s Supreme Court Counsel 
became well-known to the Supreme Court.93 Further, observers of the 
Court recognized NAAG’s effort to help state lawyers be more 
effective advocates, and some of them publicly acknowledged that the 
effort had paid off.94 
Today, NAAG’s Supreme Court program is in its thirty-second year. 
It conducts fifteen to twenty-five moot courts each Supreme Court 
term.95 The program edits and assists in the preparation of forty to fifty 
Supreme Court briefs each term, including petitions for writ of 
certiorari, merits briefs, and amicus briefs.96 It hosts two conferences 
 
91 See David O. Stewart, School’s In: Program Helps Government Lawyers Prepare to 
Argue Before the Supreme Court, 78 A.B.A. J. 41, 41 (1992). In 1991, Douglas Ross 
returned to his permanent position in the Antitrust Divisions of the United States 
Department of Justice. Id. 
92 Brandon D. Harper, Comment, The Effectiveness of State-Filed Amicus Briefs at the 
United States Supreme Court, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1503, 1522–23 (2014). 
93 Douglas Ross, Safeguarding Our Federalism: Lessons for the States from the Supreme 
Court, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 723, 728 (1985). 
94 Id. 
95 NAAG Center for Supreme Court Advocacy, NAT’L ASSOC. OF ATT’YS GEN., 
http://www.naag.org/naag/about_nagg/center-supreme-court.php (last visited Apr. 27, 
2016). 
96 Id. 
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each year and publishes a twice-monthly Supreme Court report during 
the Court’s term.97 Perhaps most significantly, NAAG’s Supreme 
Court program hosts six “fellows” each term, selected from among 
assistant attorneys general around the country. The fellows each spend 
three to four months in Washington, D.C. gaining intense exposure to 
the work of the Supreme Court.98 
B. Amicus Curiae 
The experience of Rhodes reinforced Dave Frohnmayer’s conviction 
that his effectiveness as attorney general was tied directly to his ability 
to influence the development of the law in Washington, D.C., as well 
as in Salem. As a former legislator, Frohnmayer recognized that the 
attorney general could fulfill a critical role in influencing legislation by 
acting both as an advocate for good government and, as the state’s legal 
counsel, analyzing the effect of proposed legislation. Attorney General 
Frohnmayer appeared frequently at the legislature beginning with his 
very first legislative session as attorney general. He also recognized 
and sought to nurture his department’s special relationship with the 
Oregon appellate courts. Attorneys in the DOJ’s Appellate Division 
appeared more frequently in the Oregon Court of Appeals and Oregon 
Supreme Court than attorneys from any other office. Frohnmayer 
valued the credibility that DOJ lawyers had earned from the court over 
decades of appellate advocacy. He aimed to earn the same credibility 
in the United States Supreme Court. To accomplish that, Oregon 
needed to appear frequently in that Court and when it spoke, it had to 
do so persuasively. 
Additionally, Rhodes convinced Frohnmayer that his office needed 
to pay closer attention to the United States Supreme Court’s docket. 
The NAAG Supreme Court Project was only part of the answer; the 
Oregon DOJ also needed an attitude adjustment. DOJ lawyers were 
accustomed to following and attempting to influence the legislature or 
the Oregon appellate courts. They were not trained to think of United 
States Supreme Court litigation as a tool for law development. 
Frohnmayer sought to change that by adopting a formal process for 
monitoring the Supreme Court’s docket, identifying cases in which 
Oregon held a particular interest, and working with counterparts in 
other states to present amicus briefs. Frohnmayer insisted on layers of 
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amicus brief drafted by others, and he authorized Oregon to take the 
lead in drafting amicus briefs when the issue had unique significance 
in Oregon. 
In the years between 1981 and 1991, covering most of Frohnmayer’s 
first two terms, Oregon joined a total of sixty-five amicus curiae briefs 
authored by other attorneys general offices.99 Attorneys in Oregon’s 
DOJ authored seven amicus curiae briefs filed in the Supreme Court on 
behalf of Oregon and other states during the same period.100 
V 
1982–1990: AN OREGON SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 
Between 1982 and 1990, the State of Oregon successfully obtained 
plenary United States Supreme Court review in seven cases.101 Dave 
Frohnmayer argued all seven cases, including two cases argued four 
months apart during the 1984 term.102 He won six.103 
 
99 See infra Appendix (listing the amicus curiae briefs joined by Oregon under Attorney 
General Frohnmayer). 
100 Brief for Oregon as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee, Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 
574 (1987) (No. 86-98), 1987 WL 880945; Brief for Oregon as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Appellee, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (No. 84-
1044), 1985 WL 669948; Brief for Alaska et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, 
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (No. 83-1274), 1984 WL 565678; Brief 
for Oregon as Amicus Curiae, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) 
(No. 84-325, 84-356), 1985 WL 669089; Brief for Multistate Tax Commission et al. as 
Amici Curiae, Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983) (No. 81-
523), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1695; Brief for Oregon as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Affirmance, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 
U.S. 190 (1983) (No. 81-1945), 1982 WL 958081; Brief for Dep’t of Energy of the State of 
Or., as Amicus Curiae, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 
(1982) (No. 80-1749), 1981 WL 390138. 
101 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by 
statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000b (1993); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986); Or. Dep’t of Fish & 
Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753 (1985); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 
(1985); Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983); 
Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982). In the Smith case, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, heard and decided the case twice, in 1988 and 1990. Smith, 494 U.S. 872; Emp’t 
Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988). Deputy Attorney General 
William F. Gary argued the case the first time it came before the Court. Dave Frohnmayer 
argued it the second time. Oregon prevailed both times. 
102 Oregon Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 473 U.S. 753; Elstad, 470 U.S. 298. 
103 Smith, 494 U.S. 872; Whitley, 475 U.S. 312; Oregon Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 473 
U.S. 753; Elstad, 470 U.S. 298; Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039; Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667. 
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The issues in these cases included the law of double jeopardy,104 the 
contours of the Miranda rule,105 Native American treaty rights,106 the 
liability of public defenders under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,107 the application 
of the Eighth Amendment in the context of a prison riot,108 and the 
religious use of peyote.109 Yet in every case, Oregon challenged lower 
court decisions because the legal standard that they purported to apply 
had somehow become unhinged from its doctrinal origins. In Whitely 
v. Albers, Oregon urged that the lower court had improperly equated 
“the constitutional inquiry with the inquiry that would be made in a 
common law assault and battery case.”110 In Oregon v. Elstad, it 
charged that the lower court had impermissibly “elevated the ‘cat out 
of the bag’ reasoning to the status of a per se rule of exclusion.”111 In 
Oregon v. Kennedy, Oregon complained that the Oregon Court of 
Appeals had transformed the doctrine of double jeopardy “from a 
unique constitutional value into an additional sanction . . . for 
prosecutorial misconduct.”112 And in Oregon v. Bradshaw, Tower v. 
Glover, Oregon Department of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian 
Tribe, and Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith, Oregon’s briefing painstakingly retraced the 
reasoning of the lower courts to demonstrate how they had wandered 
off course.113 
More importantly, in every one of these cases, Oregon proposed a 
rule of decision that was specific, objective, and rationally calculated 
to produce consistent outcomes that were consonant with the legal 
principle at issue. Frohnmayer was not content to win the case; he 
wanted to solve the problem. Logic and practicality were the tools he 
 
104 Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 668–69. 
105 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300; Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1041. 
106 Oregon Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 473 U.S. at 755. 
107 Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 914–15 (1984). 
108 Whitley, 475 U.S. at 312–13. 
109 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 873 (1990), superseded by 
statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000b (1993). 
110 Brief for Petitioners at 9, Whitley, 475 U.S. 312 (No. 84-1077), 1984 WL 565929. 
111 Brief of the Petitioner at 13, Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (No. 83-773), 1984 WL 
565560. 
112 Brief of the Petitioner at 13, Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982) (No. 80-1991), 
1981 WL 390227. 
113 See Brief for Petitioners, Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (No. 88-1213); Brief for Petitioners, 
Oregon Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753 (1985) (No. 83-
2148); Brief for Petitioners, Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984) (No. 82-1988); Brief for 
Petitioner, Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983) (No. 81-1857). 
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employed. Each time Frohnmayer appeared at the podium to present 
Oregon’s case to the Court, he stood as an advocate for a principle of 
law, not for a particular result. 
A. Oregon v. Kennedy 
1. Double Jeopardy 
Frohnmayer’s first oral argument in the United States Supreme 
Court was on March 29, 1982, in Oregon v. Kennedy.114 His 
presentation, like all of his oral arguments, was a spirited defense of 
the controlling legal principle that Oregon had proposed. 
Kennedy was charged with theft of a Kashan Persian rug.115 In the 
first trial, the prosecutor’s third witness was an expert who testified 
concerning the value of the rug.116 During cross-examination, defense 
counsel established that the witness had filed a criminal complaint 
against the defendant in an unrelated matter.117 On redirect, the 
prosecutor sought to have the witness explain why he had filed the 
complaint, but the trial court sustained defense objections to several 
questions.118 Finally, in frustration, the prosecutor asked: 
Prosecutor: “Have you ever done business with the Kennedys?” 
Witness: “No I have not.” 
Prosecutor: “Is that because he is a crook?”119 
Defense counsel immediately moved for a mistrial, which the trial 
court promptly granted over the prosecution’s objection.120 Prior to 
retrial, the defendant moved to dismiss the case on the ground that 
further prosecution was barred by the doctrine of double jeopardy.121 
The trial court denied the motion and the defendant was convicted.122 
On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed and held that 
double jeopardy barred defendant’s retrial.123 Writing for the court, 
 
114 To listen to Frohnmayer’s oral argument in Kennedy, visit Oral Argument, Oregon v. 
Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982) (No. 80-1991), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-1991. 






121 Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 669 (1982). 
122 Id. at 670. 
123 Id. 
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Judge W. Michael Gillette concluded that, although the prosecutor had 
not intended to cause a mistrial, her conduct nevertheless caused 
jeopardy to attach because it constituted “overreaching.”124 Judge 
Gillette reasoned: 
[W]e are of the opinion that the prosecutor’s conduct in this case 
meets one of the other forbidden criteria, viz., overreaching. The 
comment occurred during the redirect examination of a key witness. 
The prosecutor’s express intent was to rehabilitate the witness, who 
had been impeached. However, the commenting question went 
beyond rehabilitation and was, in fact, a direct personal attack on the 
general character of the defendant. As such, we think the prosecutor 
is charged with the knowledge that the commentwhich we must 
treat as intentional, at least in the sense that it appears it was made 
deliberately and after some thoughtwas certain to interfere with the 
trial process.125 
Just as lower courts prior to Rhodes had decided prison 
overcrowding cases by invoking “evolving standards of decency” and 
finding conditions that “shock the conscience,” the court of appeals in 
Kennedy had purported to apply the amorphous and ultimately 
meaningless standard of prosecutorial “overreaching.”126 The court’s 
opinion provided no real clue as to how a court should distinguish 
between mere prosecutorial error—which warrants a mistrial but does 
not bar retrial—and “overreaching,” which required termination of the 
criminal prosecution. While the Oregon Supreme Court denied 
review,127 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.128 
On appeal in the United States Supreme Court, Oregon attacked the 
“overreaching” standard invoked by the Oregon court as having 
nothing to do with the history and purpose of the former jeopardy 
clause: 
[U]nder prevailing lower court tests which convert the jeopardy 
clause into a remedial dismissal mechanism, the sanction is imposed 
or withheld on the basis of fundamentally unverifiable judgments 
about the disapprobation which should attach to the prosecutor’s 
conduct. The remedy is addressed to an undefined evil, not to a 
specific constitutional transgression. For example, in the present 
case, dismissal was deemed appropriate because the prosecutor 
“flagrantly” violated an evidentiary rule regulating the form of 
questions permitted on redirect examination. There is no suggestion 
 
124 Kennedy, 619 P.2d at 950. 
125 Id. at 949–50. 
126 Id. at 950. 
127 State v. Kennedy, 290 Or. 551 (1981). 
128 Oregon v. Kennedy, 454 U.S. 891 (1981). 
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that the prosecutor’s conduct violated any constitutionally protected 
right of the defendant. Thus, through an expansive jeopardy analysis, 
procedural rules may be accorded greater protection than 
fundamental constitutional rights, if they are violated in a way which 
offends the subjective judgment of a reviewing court.129 
Oregon argued that the “constitutional guarantee against double 
jeopardy was derived from the English common law concerning pleas 
in bar.”130 Its purpose was “to prevent the state from manipulating the 
jury system so as to retry a defendant under more favorable conditions 
(e.g., before a more sympathetic jury or with a better-prepared 
case).”131 Oregon urged that the rule for determining whether jeopardy 
attached following a mistrial, granted on defendant’s motion, should 
be consonant with the specific harm which the former jeopardy clause 
was intended to protect against: 
[J]eopardy should attach upon mistrial granted on the defendant’s 
motion, only if there is a specific finding that the conduct of the judge 
or prosecutor was motivated by an intent to cause a mistrial and thus 
to subject the defendant to successive prosecutions. It is unimportant 
whether the intent to short-circuit the trial is prompted by a vindictive 
desire to harass the defendant or by a calculated determination that a 
more favorable outcome could be achieved in a second proceeding. 
The purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to protect the 
defendant from successive prosecutions: it is not to punish the 
prosecutor. The minority of lower courts which have sought to 
convert the jeopardy clause into a standard for evaluating 
prosecutorial conduct have failed precisely because the provision 
was neither designed for, nor is it properly susceptible to, such 
conversion.132 
2. The Frohnmayer Method 
Oregon filed its brief on the merits with the United States Supreme 
Court on December 10, 1981.133 The case was set for oral argument on 
March 29, 1982.134 Frohnmayer had nearly four months to prepare to 
defend the rule of law that Oregon had proposed. He was determined 
to tap every available resource to prepare for the task. His experience 
with Rhodes and his work in helping to establish the NAAG Supreme 
 
129 Brief for Petitioner at 35, Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982) (No. 80-1991), 
1981 WL 390227. 
130 Id. at 10–11. 
131 Id. at 13. 
132 Id. at 33–34 (footnotes omitted). 
133 Id. at 1. 
134 Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 667. 
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Court Program had convinced him that intense preparation was an 
essential prerequisite to a successful oral argument. Stewart Baker’s 
Washington Post article had singled out former Washington Attorney 
General Slade Gorton as a notable exception to Baker’s sweeping 
criticism of Supreme Court advocacy on behalf of the states.135 Gorton 
had been elected to the United States Senate.136 And, on a visit to 
Washington, D.C. early in 1982, Frohnmayer invited the senator to 
dinner. 
During his tenure as attorney general, Senator Gorton had argued 
twelve cases in the Supreme Court, mostly involving disputes between 
the State of Washington and various Indian tribes.137 At dinner near 
Capitol Hill, Senator Gorton told Frohnmayer that prior to every 
argument, he had traveled to Washington, D.C. with his appeal team at 
least five days in advance. He used the time to focus exclusively on the 
case he would argue. Senator Gorton emphasized the importance of 
anticipating questions. He made clear that, for him, preparation was not 
a solitary endeavor. He likened the process to participating in an in-
depth seminar on the issues in the case. 
Frohnmayer emulated Senator Gorton’s practice and built upon it. 
He scheduled two moot courts while in Washington, D.C. preparing for 
the Kennedy argument, enlisting the aid of experienced Supreme Court 
practitioners to serve as moot court judges. He kept a running list of 
potential questions and drafted and redrafted his answers. The Kennedy 
appeal team138 read everything it could find that each Justice had 
written on the subject of double jeopardy and it developed a strategy to 
win each Justice’s vote or to neutralize the opposition of those whose 
vote was out of reach. Taking another lesson from Rhodes, they 
 
135 Baker, supra note 81. 
136 Slade Gorton, K&L GATES, http://www.klgates.com/slade-gorton/ (last visited Apr. 
28, 2016). 
137 See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 
(1980); Idaho v. Oregon, 444 U.S. 380 (1980); Washington v. Wash. State Commercial 
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979); Washington v. Confederate Bands & 
Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979); Dep’t of Revenue of Wash. v. Ass’n 
of Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978); Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game 
for Wash., 433 U.S. 165 (1977); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertisers Comm’n, 432 U.S. 
333 (1977); E.P.A. v. California ex rel State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976); 
Standard Pressed Steel v. Wash. Dep’t of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975); DeFunis v. 
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). 
138 Solicitor General William F. Gary and Assistant Attorneys General Robert E. Barton, 
John C. Bradley, Thomas H. Denney, and Stephen F. Peifer appeared on the Oregon briefs 
in the United States Supreme Court. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 113, at 1. 
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searched for in-chambers opinions by individual Circuit Justices. And 
every evening, Frohnmayer updated his oral argument outline to reflect 
the deeper understanding of the case that the day’s efforts had brought. 
The particular challenge in arguing Kennedy was to keep the focus 
on the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause and the rule that Oregon 
proposed rather than focusing on the prosecutorial misconduct that had 
caused the mistrial. It was easy to be critical of the prosecutor’s actions, 
but there were also mitigating circumstances that made her error more 
understandable. As an advocate, Frohnmayer’s instinctive reaction to 
criticism of one of the state’s lawyers was to rise to her defense. 
However, he recognized that doing so could consume all of the twenty 
minutes that he would have at the podium.139 Frohnmayer prepared for 
the argument intent on defending Oregon’s proposed rule of law, not 
the prosecutor’s actions. 
On the last evening before the argument, Frohnmayer put the 
finishing touches on the outline that he would take with him to the 
podium in a small three ring binder—the same binder he would use for 
every Supreme Court argument. In a practice that he followed in every 
case, the last entry he made in his outline, handwritten at the top of the 
first page, were the words: “Button Coat. Speak Slowly.” 
At the oral argument, after a brief description of the facts of the case, 
Frohnmayer put forth the central proposition of his case: 
 The proposition we would put to this Court is simple, and that is 
that a defendant who elects to move for a mistrial cannot raise a 
jeopardy bar to his retrial except in one narrow circumstance, and 
that is where the prosecutor’s conduct itself is intended to provoke 
that very mistrial, and we note at the outset the anomaly that under 
the settled law of this Court, had defendant merely objected to the 
question, been convicted, and then secured successful reversal upon 
appeal, he could be retried.140 
Justice Marshall questioned Frohnmayer aggressively about the 
prosecutor’s conduct and Frohnmayer declined to defend the 
prosecutor’s actions, returning instead to his central theme. 
 
139 The United States Solicitor General had filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the 
United States in support of Oregon’s position. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 
Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (No. 80-1991), 1981 WL 390230. As tradition dictates, Oregon 
agreed to cede ten minutes of its allotted argument time to the U.S. Solicitor General. 
Arguing with Frohnmayer in support of the Petitioner was a young assistant solicitor general 
who, like Frohnmayer, was arguing his first case before the Court: Samuel A. Alito, now an 
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 668 
(Samuel A. Alito, Jr. arguing as amicus curiae by special leave of the Court). 
140 Transcript of Oral Argument at 2, Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982) (No. 80-1991). 
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Unknown Speaker: The Court of Appeals didn’t rule on that point. It 
ruled on flagrant. 
David B. Frohnmayer: The Court of Appeals – 
Unknown Speaker: Isn’t that right? 
David B. Frohnmayer: The Court of Appeals accepted the findings 
of the trial court. 
Unknown Speaker: That’s right. 
David B. Frohnmayer: Which, Justice Marshall – 
Unknown Speaker: And said, however, this case of flagrant 
overreaching lies outside that rule. 
David B. Frohnmayer: Well – 
Unknown Speaker: Isn’t that the ruling of the court? It is the last . . . 
next to last sentence. 
David B. Frohnmayer: We understand that that is in fact what the 
Court of Appeals said, and we have no quarrel with the 
characterization of the prosecutor’s conduct as improper. What we 
simply state – 
Unknown Speaker: Flagrant? Do you agree with flagrant? 
David B. Frohnmayer: That is a characterization that – 
Unknown Speaker: That is, your court used that word. 
David B. Frohnmayer: Well, that is a characterization of the Court of 
Appeals by which I assume that we are bound. However, it does 
differ, I must say, in at least emphasis or epithet from that which was 
given to it by the trial judge whose findings the Court of Appeals 
accepted. 
Unknown Speaker: Perhaps stupid would have been a better 
characterization. 
David B. Frohnmayer: Well, we come to this Court with no apologies 
for the prosecutor’s conduct, and I hope that is clear to this Court. 
What we are simply saying is that however flagrant the conduct may 
be, whatever epithet had been attached to it, it was not of the 
character and kind which this Court’s prior decisions and dicta, at 
least, quite properly indicate should be the occasion for finding that 
the mistrial motion was one into which the defendant was goaded 
without any real option or without any real choice.141 
A few minutes later, another Justice returned to the character of the 
prosecutor’s conduct: 
 
141 Id. at 7–8. 
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Unknown Speaker: But he says, this is a case . . . well, do you deny 
that there was overreaching? 
David B. Frohnmayer: No, we have never contended that the nature 
of the prosecutor’s conduct was appropriate. We are merely saying it 
does not fit the characterization of intentional misconduct designed 
to abort a trial . . . .142 
Two months after the oral argument, in an opinion by Justice 
Rehnquist, the Supreme Court reversed the Oregon appellate court and 
adopted the constitutional test that Frohnmayer had advocated: 
 Prosecutorial conduct that might be viewed as harassment or 
overreaching, even if sufficient to justify a mistrial on defendant’s 
motion, therefore, does not bar retrial absent intent on the part of the 
prosecutor to subvert the protections afforded by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. A defendant’s motion for mistrial constitutes “a 
deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have his 
guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact.” . . . Only 
where the government conduct in question is intended to “goad” the 
defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of 
double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting 
the first on his own motion.143 
The Court also echoed the criticism that Frohnmayer had leveled at 
the hopelessly amorphous “overreaching” standard: 
The difficulty with the more general standards which would permit a 
broader exception than one merely based on intent is that they offer 
virtually no standards for their application. . . . 
 . . . 
 . . . The “overreaching” standard applied by the court below and 
urged today by Justice STEVENS, however, would add another 
classification of prosecutorial error, one requiring dismissal of the 
indictment, but without supplying any standard by which to assess 
that error.144 
Frohnmayer was, of course, pleased with the result in Kennedy, but 
he was also convinced that the approach that Oregon had taken to the 
case and the method he used to prepare for oral argument had 
contributed to that result. He and the rest of the Kennedy appeals team 
were struck by how much their understanding of the issues in the case 
had grown as a result of the intense preparation that preceded the oral 
argument. After full briefing in the court of appeals, a petition for 
Oregon Supreme Court review, a certiorari petition and full briefing on 
 
142 Id. at 12. 
143 Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 675–76 (citations omitted). 
144 Id. at 674–75 (footnote omitted). 
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the merits in the United States Supreme Court, it was surprising that a 
week of intense study had made everyone involved believe that they 
finally had gained a more complete understanding of the case. 
Frohnmayer wondered if the same technique could be used effectively, 
at the beginning of a problem, to determine the state’s legal position 
and to set a strategy to implement it. 
B. State v. City of Rajneeshpuram 
Shortly after the Kennedy decision, Frohnmayer had an opportunity 
to test the hypothesis that the “deep dive” technique could be 
effectively employed at the beginning of a case. Followers of an Indian 
Guru named Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh had purchased a sixty-four-
thousand-acre ranch that straddled Jefferson and Wasco counties in 
central Oregon.145 They were building a religious community that 
became the residence for thousands of the Bhagwan’s followers.146 On 
May 26, 1982, the residents of the religious commune incorporated it 
as a municipality pursuant to Oregon law.147 All of the land within the 
city limits (except for a single county road) was owned by a for-profit 
corporation. That corporation was, in turn, wholly owned by a religious 
foundation that was exempt from taxation as a religious organization. 
The land within the city limits was leased to a cooperative, the articles 
of incorporation for which described its purpose as “to be a religious 
community, whose life is, in every respect, guided by the religious 
teachings of [the spiritual head of the religious foundation described 
above] and whose members live a communal life with a common 
treasury.”148 The presence in Oregon of a city whose boundaries were 
coterminous with the boundaries of a privately owned religious 
commune presented numerous complicated legal questions for state 
agencies which had to relate to the city on an almost daily basis. Was 
the city entitled to participate in state revenue sharing or would such 
payments constitute providing financial support to a religion? Could 
members of the city’s police department be certified by the state as law 
enforcement officers? Indeed, could a city that included only property 
owned and controlled by a religious organization even be permitted to 
 
145 Les Zaitz, 25 Years After Rajneeshi Commune Collapsed, Truth Spills Out—Part 1 of 
5, OREGONIAN (Apr. 14, 2011, 2:13 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/rajneesh/index.ssf 
/2011/04/part_one_it_was_worse_than_we.html. 
146 Id. 
147 Oregon v. City of Rajneeshpuram, 598 F. Supp. 1208, 1210 (D. Or. 1984). 
148 44 Or. Op. Att’y Gen. 20, 22 (1983). 
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incorporate and exercise governmental power? The attorney general 
had been asked to give a formal opinion on these matters. 
The DOJ’s research quickly led it to the United States Supreme 
Court’s 1982 decision in Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc.149 Grendel’s 
Den was a restaurant in Cambridge, Massachusetts, near the campus of 
Harvard College. Its application for a liquor license had been denied 
based upon the objection of a church that was located within five 
hundred feet of the restaurant.150 A statute provided that the governing 
body of a school or a church had unfettered power to prevent issuance 
of a liquor license for an establishment within a five-hundred-foot 
radius of the church or school.151 The Supreme Court ruled that the 
statute was unconstitutional because it violated the Establishment 
Clause152: 
Section 16C substitutes the unilateral and absolute power of a church 
for the reasoned decisionmaking of a public legislative body acting 
on evidence and guided by standards, on issues with significant 
economic and political implications. The challenged statute thus 
enmeshes churches in the processes of government and creates the 
danger of “political fragmentation and divisiveness along religious 
lines.” Ordinary human experience and a long line of cases teach that 
few entanglements could be more offensive to the spirit of the 
Constitution.153 
Frohnmayer thought that Grendel’s Den should be dispositive of 
whether a religious commune could exercise government power. If it 
is a violation of the Establishment Clause for a church to exercise veto 
power over the issuance of a liquor license, surely it must be 
unconstitutional for a church to control a city. But the analogy was not 
perfect. Oregon’s land use laws prohibited siting a commune of any 
kind on rural property zoned for farming and grazing.154 The interplay 
between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause was 
subtle and complex. The DOJ could find no case in which the 
incorporation of a city had been found to violate the Establishment 
Clause, especially where such incorporation was a prerequisite to 
 
149 Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982). 
150 Id. at 118. 
151 Id. at 117. 
152 Id. at 126–28. 
153 Id. at 127 (citations omitted). 
154 See 1000 Friends of Or. v. Wasco County, 659 P.2d 1001, 1002 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) 
(challenge to the incorporation of Rajneeshpuram based upon Oregon land use laws). 
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establishing a religious commune. Frohnmayer wanted to drill deeper 
into the issue before he issued an opinion. 
Grendel’s Den had been represented in the Supreme Court by 
Professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School,155 a professional 
acquaintance of Frohnmayer’s. Frohnmayer solicited Professor Tribe’s 
help and he generously donated his time to give it. DOJ attorneys and 
Frohnmayer met with Professor Tribe on multiple occasions to dissect 
the constitutional issues raised by the incorporation of the City of 
Rajneeshpuram. Professor Tribe essentially conducted private 
seminars on the religion clauses of the United States Constitution for 
Oregon’s attorneys. On October 6, 1983, Frohnmayer issued a formal 
opinion which concluded, inter alia, that the incorporation of the City 
of Rajneeshpuram violated the Establishment Clause and Article I, 
section 5 of the Oregon Constitution.156 Shortly thereafter, he filed a 
declaratory judgment action to determine whether Oregon should 
recognize the city. On October 12, 1984, Judge Helen Frye granted 
Attorney General Frohnmayer’s motion for summary judgment and 
declared that the incorporation of the City of Rajneeshpuram was 
unconstitutional.157 
CONCLUSION 
Frohnmayer continued to employ the “Frohnmayer method” for 
developing state legal policy for the rest of his tenure as attorney 
general. After Kennedy, he never presented an argument in any court 
without at least one moot court and a seminar on the issues in the case. 
He also insisted that the state’s arguments in any forum be based upon 
rigorous analysis and that they be consistent, principled, and well-
reasoned. In this way, he fulfilled his wife Lynn’s prediction that, as 
attorney general, he would be “the legal conscience of the state.”158 
  
 
155 Larkin, 459 U.S. at 117. 
156 44 Or. Op. Att’y Gen. 20 (1983).  
157 Oregon v. City of Rajneeshpuram, 598 F. Supp. 1208, 1216–17 (D. Or. 1984). 
158 Willis, supra note 38, at 9B. 
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1989 WL 1127054 
Brief for Georgia et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 
U.S. 18 (1990) (No. 88-192), 1989 WL 1127321 
Brief for Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Pa. 
Dep’t Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990) (No. 89-
156), 1989 WL 1127306 
Brief for Idaho et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
California v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 495 U.S. 490 (1990) 
(No. 89-333), 1990 WL 10013080 
Brief for California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990) (No. 
88-1668), 1989 WL 1127151 
Brief for Thirty-Two States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990) (No. 89-258), 
1989 WL 1127193 
Brief for Massachusetts et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Balt. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 
549 (1990) (Nos. 88-1182, 88-6651), 1988 WL 1025720 
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Brief for Idaho et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Alcan Aluminium Ltd., 493 U.S. 331 
(1990) (No. 88-1400), 1989 WL 1126907 
Brief for Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell 
Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) (No. 87-1252), 1988 WL 1025656 
Brief for New York et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (No. 87-
107), 1988 WL 1022925 
Brief for California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) (No. 88-305), 1988 
WL 1026302 
Brief for New York et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 
(1989) (No. 87-154), 1988 WL 1025918 
Brief for Indiana et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (No. 87-764), 1988 WL 
1025585 
Brief for New York et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (No. 87-
998), 1988 WL 1023102 
Brief for New Jersey et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee, 
Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19 (1988) (No. 
87-984), 1988 WL 1025765 
Brief for Connecticut et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance, 
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (No. 86-6757), 1987 WL 881354 
Brief for South Dakota et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) (No. 87-5428), 
1988 WL 1031606 
Brief for New York et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, 
N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988) 
(No. 86-1836), 1988 WL 1026272 
Brief for Twenty-Five States as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 
U.S. 492 (1988) (No. 87-157), 1987 WL 880505 
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Brief for Minnesota et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (No. 
87-259), 1987 WL 881133 
Brief for Forty-Two States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (No. 
85-1910), 1987 WL 881329 
Brief for New York et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
P.R. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs v. ISLA Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 
495 (1988) (No. 86-1406), 1987 WL 880479 
Brief for Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415 (1988) (No. 86-978), 1987 WL 
881418 
Brief for California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988) (No. 86-
870), 1987 WL 881386 
Brief for Massachusetts et al. as Amici Curiae Urging Affirmance, 
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (No. 86-133), 
1987 WL 864768 
Brief for Arkansas et al. as Amici Curiae Urging Affirmance, 
Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987) (No. 85-5348) 
Brief for Arkansas et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987) (No. 86-572), 1987 WL 
880218 
Brief for Pennsylvania et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (No. 85-1722), 
1986 WL 727861 
Brief for Alaska et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Utah 
Div. State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193 (1987) (No. 85-
1772), 1986 WL 727866 
Brief for Minnesota et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, 
Bd. Dir. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 
(1987) (No. 86-421), 1987 WL 880555 
Brief for California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 481 U.S. 454 (1987) 
(No. 86-337), 1986 WL 727543 
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Brief for Alaska et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Cal. 
Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987) (No. 85-
1200), 1986 WL 727642 
Brief for California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 
(1987) (No. 85-1092), 1986 WL 728344 
Brief for Twenty-Six States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (No. 85-660), 1986 WL 
727464 
Brief for Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986) (No. 85-1033), 1986 WL 
727557 
Brief for California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 
501 (1986) (No. 84-1999), 1986 WL 728279 
Brief for California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Local 28 Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. Equal Emp’t 
Opportunity Comm’n, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (No. 84-1656), 1986 
WL 728279 
Brief for Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae, Lockhart v. McCree, 476 
U.S. 162 (1986) (No. 84-1865), 1985 WL 669159 
Brief for Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986) (No. 84-1288), 1985 WL 
669537 
Brief for Minnesota et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (No. 84-1586), 1985 WL 
669679 
Brief for Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985) (No. 84-648), 1984 WL 
565876 
Brief for Ohio et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Cleveland Bd. Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (Nos. 83-
1362, 83–1363), 1984 WL 565428 
Brief for Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (No. 
82-1260), 1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 403 
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Brief for Arkansas et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, 
Hayfield N. R.R. Co. v. Chi. & N.W. Transp. Co., 467 U.S. 622 
(1984) (No. 82-1579), 1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 746 
Brief for Delaware et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, 
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512 (1984) 
(No. 83-372), 1984 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 217 
Brief for Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, 
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (No. 82-1278), 1983 U.S. S. 
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 645 
Brief for Minnesota et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (No. 82-1432), 1983 U.S. S. 
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 157 
Brief for Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (No. 82-1554), 1983 
WL 482732 
Brief for Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984) (No. 81-1374), 1983 U.S. S. 
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 578 
Brief for Forty-Six States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 
752 (1984) (No. 82-914), 1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 386 
Brief for the Coastal States Org. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents Sec’y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984) 
(Nos. 82-1326, 82-1327), 1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 93 
Brief for Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983) (Nos. 81-2245, 81-
2276, 82–38), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 942 
Brief for Maryland et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773 (1983) (No. 81-2125), 1983 U.S. 
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1374 
Brief for California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 
273 (1983) (No. 81-2337), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 636 
Brief for Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Illinois v. Abbott & Assocs., Inc., 460 U.S. 557 (1983) (No. 81-
1114), 1981 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1420 
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Brief for Indiana et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, South 
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) (No. 81-1453), 1982 WL 
608793 
Brief for Multistate Tax Comm’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 458 U.S. 
307 (1982) (No. 80-2015), 1982 WL 608693 
Brief for Multistate Tax Comm’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Appellee, F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t of 
N.M., 458 U.S. 354 (1982) (No. 80-1745), 1980 WL 339716 
Brief for Michigan et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) 
(No. 81-750), 1982 WL 608494 
Brief for Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Toll 
v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (No. 80-2178), 1991 WL 390329 
Brief for Washington et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
California ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. United States, 457 U.S. 
273 (1982) (No. 89, Original), 1982 WL 608584 
 
